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p<'mtlty." I find no di:-;tiugni:-;hing feature:;;. It appears to 
lllP 1lwt tlw $fi0 provision here might just as well be held to 
lw a penalty in th1: pvent of non perfm·maJlf~l:' by the defendant, 
and that it <~ertainly bears no reasonable relation to the 1m;ses 
which the parties had in contemplation. 
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial 
<~ourt to rPtry the ease and submit the issue of damages to 
1 he jnry. 
[S. I<'. No. 18603. In Bank. Feb. 6, 1953.] 
HAI_j lVI. A'l'KINSON et al., Respondents, v. PACIFIC FIRE 
EX'l'INGUISHER COMPANY, Appellant. 
[1] Contracts-Performance-Waiver of Breach.-Where contract 
by which defendant company installed fire detection system 
in plaintiffs' planing mill provides for an annual rental pay-
able in monthly installments, defendant's acceptance of over-
due payments constitutes a waiver of strict compliance by 
plaintiffs. 
[2a, 2b] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determin-
ation of Validity of Stipulation.-Provision in contract that 
in case of failure of fire detection system installed by defend-
ant company in plaintiffs' planing mill to perform detection 
service and a resulting loss the company's liability shall be lim-
ited to $25 as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, is 
a valid provision for liquidated damages where the parties 
had no way of knowing what type of fire might occur after 
a particular failure of the detection system and could not 
have predicted what portion of the foss in any particular 
fire would be the proximate result of failure of such system, 
and where the uncertain extent to which losses might occur, 
viewed from the time of entering into the contract, would 
make the task of fixing damages an extremely difficult if not 
an impossible one. 
[3] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provi-
sion.-One who relies on a clause for liquidated damages in a 
contract must show that the parties to the contract "agree 
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the 
amount of damages sustained by a breach thereof." (Civ. 
Code, § 1671.) 
[3] See Oal.Jur., Damages, § 94; Am.Jur., Damages, § 240. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 248; [2, 6] Damages, 
§ 126; [3, 4] Damages, § 117; [5] Damages, § 120. 
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[4] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provi-
sion.-The amount agreed on in a clause for liquidated dam-
ages must result from a reasonable endeavor by the parties 
to estimate a fair compensation for any loss that may be 
sustained because of a breach. 
[5] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Construction of Stip-
ulation.-An agreement that on failure of a fire detection 
system installed by defendant company in plaintiffs' planing 
mill to function properly and a resulting loss such company 
shall pay $25 as liquidated damages is valid where, in view 
of the fact that neither party could foresee what the con-
sequences of a breach might be, the damages might be greater 
or less than the amount agreed on, and the agreement is not 
one providing for a penalty wherein the amount agreed on 
bears no reasonable relation to the losses the parties con-
sidered might be sustained. 
[6] Id.- Liquidated Damages and Penalties- Determination of 
Validity of Stipulation.-While a stipulation by parties to 
a contract that they agreed on an amount "as liquidated 
damages, and not as a penalty" is not conclusive, it is en-
titl~d to some weight. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. S. Victor ~Wagler, Judge. Modified and af-
firmed. 
Action for damages for breach of contract. Modified and 
affirmed. 
Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley and Charles A. Beardsley 
for Appellant. 
Clark & Heafey, Thornton & Taylor and Augustin Dono-
van for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment on a ver-
dict for $97,437 in favor of the plaintiffs in an action for 
breach of contract. 'l'he questions presented are the effect 
of a prior default by the plaintiffs and the validity of a clause 
in a written contract fixing liquidated damages for breach of 
the contract. 
On June 5, 1939, plaintiffs entered into a written "lease" 
agreement with the defendant company whereby the defendant 
agreed to install, maintain and operate a fire detection sys-
tem in the plaintiffs' planing mill located in Oakland. The 
40 C.2d-7 
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system was designed to detect fires originating on the plain-
tiffs' premises and to automatically transmit signals to the 
Municipal :B1 ire Alarm System of the City of Oakland. The 
term of the lease was 10 years, at an annual rental of $180 
payable in monthly installments of $15 each. Paragraph 6 
provides that in the event of default in payments, the de-
fendant had the right to enter and remove the detection 
system. Paragraph 11 provides, "It is agreed by and be-
tween the parties hereto that the Lessor is not an insurer, 
and that the payments hereinbefore named are based solely 
on the value of the services in the operation of the system de-
scribed, and in case of failure to perform such service and a 
resulting loss its liability hereunder shall be limited to and 
fixed at the sum of Twenty-five dollars as liquidated damages, 
and not as a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive.'' 
On July 8, 1948, while the system supposedly remained 
in operation, a fire was discovered in the plaintiffs' mill. The 
defendant does not contest the implied finding of the jury 
that the detection system failed to operate. The :first alarm 
to the fire department was manually transmitted by one of the 
plaintiffs' employees, and there is evidence that fire fighting 
equipment arrived on the scene within two minutes after the 
alarm. Nevertheless the :fire was then out of control and 
the planing mill was destroyed. 
[1] At the time of the :fire the plaintiffs were in default 
in the payment of the monthly rental installments for June 
and July of 1948. During the trial the plaintiffs tendered and 
the defendant accepted these payments. There was evidence 
received without objection that throughout the period of the 
lease the plaintiffs' payments were occasionally in arrears. 
During most of 1946 payments were made a month or more 
after becoming due. On these occasions the defendant did 
not remove the detection system or discontinue the service nor 
was there any demand for strict compliance. Time had not 
been made of the essence of the contract. It was customary 
for the plaintiffs to pay the rental charges upon receipt of an 
invoice each month, and although controverted there was 
evidence that invoices were not received for June and July. 
'l1he record furnishes substantial grounds for the application 
of the principle that where an obligee condones delay in 
periodic performance strict compliance thereafter is waived. 
(Boone v. Templeman (1910), 158 Cal. 290 [110 P. 947. 139 
Am.St. Rep. 126] ; Kern Stmset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co. 
(1931), 214 Cal. 435 [6 P.2d 71, 80 A.L.R. 453].) 
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In view of the conclusion on the second phase of the case 
concerning liquidated damages it is unnecessary to discuss 
other points made by the defendant as to the form of the 
pleadings and the evidence with reference to the question of 
waiver. It is enough to say that the implied findings of the 
jury to the effect that the defendant's acceptance of overdue 
payments constituted a waiver of strict performance is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
The principal contention of the defendant is that para-
graph 11 of the contract is a valid provision for liquidated 
damages. This is the second phase of the case and the facts 
with reference thereto are undisputed. Civil Code, section 
1670, states that a provision in a contract which provides 
for the amount of damages to be paid in the event of a sub-
sequent breach of the contract is void, except as expressly 
provided in section 1671 as follows: "The parties to a con-
tract may agree therein upon an amount which shall be pre-
sumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach 
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be im-
practicable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." 
In the case of Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American District 
Tel. Co., ante, p. 179 [253 P.2d 10], this day decided, 
it was held that the question whether it would be impracticable 
or extremely difficult to fix liquidated damages is generally 
a question of fact and that the time for the determination of 
the question is the time of making the contract. It was also 
held in that case that the question becomes one of law where 
the facts are not in dispute and admit of but one conclusion. 
[2a] In the present case the defendant claims that as a 
matter of law the jury could not properly have found that it 
was not impracticable or extremely difficult to fix actual 
damages when viewed from the position of the contracting 
parties under all the circumstances of the case existing at the 
time the contract was executed. The defendant points out that 
the detection system was intended to provide protection in 
case of a wide variety of fires. Some of them would be 
slow burning, as in a bed of sawdust, where a loss resulting 
from the failure of the detection system might be negligible. 
Other fires might result only in a pitted floor. Still others 
would immediately envelop the buildings in flames and result 
in a very substantial loss. Looking ahead the parties had no 
way of knowing what type of fire might occur after a par-
ticular failure of the detection system. The merit in the 
defendant's contention lies in the argument that in no event 
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could the parties have predicted what portion of the loss 
in any particular fire would be the proximate result of the 
failure of the detection system. It is true that in the event 
the detection system was functioning properly, there would 
probably be some damage by fire prior to the alarm; that 
further damage would have occurred before the fire fighting 
equipment could have been put into operation; and that the 
fire may have been of such a nature that the planing mill would 
have been consumed. 'l'he uncertain extent to which losses 
might occur viewed from the time of entering into the con-
tract would make the task of fixing damages an extremely 
difficult if not an impossible one. There were additional 
factors to be considered, such as the weather conditions at 
the time of the fire, the season of the year, the success of the 
municipal fire fighting department in moving through traffic 
to the scene of the fire, and the presence of a full crew of em-
ployees or of only a night watchman on the premises. The 
factors involved were too many and too variable to permit of 
any certainty in predicting the extent of the losses directly 
attributable to the failure of the detection system with refer-
ence to a particular fire. 
The liquidation clause here in question is in effect the same 
as that appearing in the contract considered in the companion 
case of Better Food Markets, Inc., v. American District Tel. 
Co., ante, p. 179 [253 P.2d 10], above referred to. There 
the parties contracted for the installation and operation of a 
burglar alarm system which failed to operate. A substantial 
loss occurred. It was held, as here, that under the undisputed 
facts it was competent for the parties, at the time the contract 
was executed, to agree that it was impracticable or extremely 
difficult to fix in advance the actual damages that might re-
sult from a breach of the contract. 
It is true that the validity of a clause for liquidated dam-
ages may be questioned on other grounds. [3] One who 
relies upon a liquidation clause must show that the parties 
to the contract" agree therein upon an amount which shall be 
presumed to be the amount of damages sustained by a breach 
thereof ... " ( Civ. Code, § 1671.) [ 4] As held in the 
Better Food Markets, Inc. case the amount agreed upon must 
result from a reasonable endeavor by the parties to estimate 
a fair compensation fbr any loss that may be sustained be-
cause of a breach. [2b] In the present case the defendant, 
for a compensation of $15 a month agreed to sound an early 
warning in case of fire; also to inspect and test the detection 
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system, anu to maintain the equipment which was a part 
thereof. It was agreed that the payments were based "solely 
on the value of the services in the operation of the system" 
and that in the event of a failure of the defendant "to per-
form such services and a resulting loss.'' its liability was to 
be fixed at $25 as liquidated damages. It is to be noted that 
the contract does not limit the defendant's liability to losses 
resulting from fire, but rather to losses resulting from the 
defendant's failure to perform the contracted-for services, 
which services included inspecting, testing and maintaining 
the equipment as well as early warning in the event of a fire. 
These supplementary services were recognized in the contract 
to have value in themselves. They also included advantageous 
fire insurance rates where a detection system was kept in 
operation. A breach of contract by the defendant, then, 
might result in losses to the plaintiff other than fire losses, 
such as the cost to the plaintiff of maintaining the system 
where the defendant had failed to do so. From the stand-
point of the defendant it was important that it should know 
the extent of its liability. From the small compensation re-
ceived obviously it could not afford to assume responsibilities 
such as are assumed in the case of fire insurance coverage. 
On the other hand, while the plaintiffs could not and did not 
expect the defendant to furnish the security which fire in-
surance would afford, they were entitled to some compensation 
for the defendant's breach of contract although they had no 
way of knowing either the nature or the extent of a loss 
which might result after the defendant's breach. In view of 
the fact that neither party could foresee what the consequences 
of a breach would be, it was entirely reasonable for them to 
agree upon the stated amount which by the statute is then 
presumed to be the damages sustained because of a breach. 
'rhese damages, as stated, might be greater or less than the 
amount agreed upon. The greater the difficulty encountered 
by the parties in estimating the damages, the greater should 
be the range of estimates which the courts should uphold as 
reasonable. ( 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1059, p. 291.) 
[5] To hold that the parties have not entered into a valid 
contract for liquidated damages, it would be necessary to con-
strue the agreement as one for a penalty wherein the amount 
agreed upon bore no reasonable relation to the losses the 
parties considered might be sustained. This cannot be said to 
be true in this case. [6] The parties did stipulate that 
they agreed upon an amount ''as liquidated damages, and not 
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as a penalty.'' \Vhile not conclusive, such a stipulation is 
entitled to some weight. (Stark v. Shemada, 187 Cal.. 785, 
788 [204 P. 214]; Restatement of Contracts,§ 339(f), p. 544.) 
'l'he view here taken of the effect of paragraph 11 of the 
contract makes it unnecessary to consider arguments by the 
defendant wherein it attempts to uphold the validity of para-
graph 11 as a provision for limited liability. The language 
employed is clear and unambiguous and does not attempt to 
limit damages but rather to provide a fixed amount in the 
event of a breach, whether the actual damages should be 
greater or less than that amount. Under all of the facts 
and circumstances of the case the provision is a valid clause 
for liquidated damages as authorized by statute. 
The judgment of the trial court is modified by reducing 
the same to the sum of $25 without costs'. As so modified 
the judgment is affirmed. Each party shall bear its own 
costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Paragraph 11 of the agreement between plaintiffs and de-
fendant company provided that "It is agreed by and between 
the parties hereto that the Lessor is not an insurer, and that 
the payments hereinbefore named are based solely on the 
value of the services in the operation of the system described, 
and in case of failure to perform such service and a resulting 
loss its liability hereunder shall be lirnited to and fixed at the 
surn of 'fwenty-five dollars as liquidated damages, and not as 
a penalty, and this liability shall be exclusive." (Emphasis 
added.) 'l'his provision is held by the majority of this court 
to constitute a valid and enforceable provision for liquidated 
damages. 
Section 1670 of the Civil Code provides that a provision in 
a contract which provides for the amount of damages to be 
paid in the event of a subsequent breach of the contract is 
void, except as expressly provided in section 1671. Section 
1671 provides that ''The parties to a contract may agree 
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the 
amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from 
the nature of the case, it would be irnpracticable or extrernely 
difficult to fix the actual darnage." (Emphasis added.) 
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It is conceded in Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American 
District Tel. Co., ante, p. 179 [253 P.2d 10], this day 
filed, that the question as to whether it would be impracticable 
or extremely difficult to fix liquidated damages is generally 
(see my dissent in that case) a question of fact. The jury 
here made that determination adversely to defendants, but 
this court has reversed that determination and decided, for 
itself, the question of fact and, in so doing, has once again 
usurped the function of the jury. This is another of the 
growing list of cases where a fact question has been decided 
by the trial court on demurrer, by a jury, again by the trial 
court on a motion for a new trial, and by the District Court 
of Appeal which affirmed the judgment (Cal.App.) 240 P.2d 
651 and this court reverses. This practice-that of reversing 
findings of fact, and implied findings, made on conflicting 
evidence by the trial court and the jury-may very well at 
some later date be held to violate the constitutional provision 
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) which guarantees that "The right 
of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate; 
" (See, also, 23 So. Cal.L.Rev., pp. 334-343.) 
The person seeking enforcement of a liquidated damage 
clause has the burden of establishing that at the time the 
contract was entered into the nature of the agreement was such 
that it would be extremely impracticable or difficult for a 
court (or jury) to fix the actual damage in the event of a 
breach (Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382 [115 P.2d 498, 138 
A.L.R. 589]). It is said that "It is a question of fact in each 
instance whether the nature of the case is such that it would 
be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual dam-
age." (Rice v. Schmid, supra, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
It cannot be said with a clear conscience that in the event 
of damage by fire, it would be impracticable or extremely 
difficult to fix the amount of damages which might be suffered. 
It happens every day. Appraisers estimate the amount of 
damage which could be done by fire, or theft, to whatever type 
of business or residence is involved. Hence, it could easily 
have been ascertained how damages were to be computed in 
the event a fire occurred. It could have been computed what 
the damages would be in the event the fire occurred in the 
planing mill, in the stacks of lumber, in the office, the saw-
dust piles, or any other part of plaintiffs' property. There is a 
going price for lumber, repairs, etc. at any time of the year. 
In the Schmid case, supra, the price of flour was involved. 
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This court held that a provision for liquidated damages 
could not be upheld because actual damages involved could 
have been estimated in accordance with established principles. 
vV e said there that ''In states like California, which have code 
sections governing the matter of liquidated damages, the 
courts cannot disregard the plain provision of the statute.'' 
It is said in the majority opinion that "It is to be noted 
that the contract does not limit the defendant's liability to 
losses resulting from fire, but rather to losses resulting from 
the defendant's failure to perform the contracted-for services, 
which services included inspecting, testing and maintaining 
the equipment as well as early warning in the event of a fire.'' 
It is not essential that any such thing be noted. It can 
as easily be inferred from the language used that the plain-
tiffs' purpose in installing the system was only the early 
detection of fire so that losses might be minimized. The 
agreement provides that the payments (rental) are based 
''solely on the value of the services in the operation of the 
system described" and that "in case of failure to perform 
stteh service and a resulting loss," the defendant's liability 
should be limited to $25. (Emphasis added.) It surely is 
reasonable to infer from the language used that the only value 
of the system was the early detection of a fire; that "resulting 
loss'' meant a loss from fire. But the majority concludes 
that a breach of this contract might result in a loss, other than 
from fire, ''such as the cost to the plaintiff of maintaining the 
system where the defendant has failed to do so.'' This state-
ment appears to me to be the height of absurdity. The main-
tenance of a fire detection system is a matter for experts; 
plaintiffs would have no way of knowing whether or not de-
fendant had maintained it in proper working order until a 
test, such as a fire, occurred and until precisely the same 
results as here occurred. 
The so-called liquidated damage provision here was for 
$25. This court in the Schmid case said that ''A valid 
liquidated damage clause must, of course, rep1·esent a reason-
able endeavor by the parties to estimate fair compensation for 
the loss sustained. (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. 
Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 593 [189 P. 445]; 3 Willis-
ton, Contracts ( 1936), p. 2192, sec. 779 ; Restatement of Con-
tracts, sec. 339; 10 Cal.L.Rev. 8, 14.)" (Emphasis added.) 
It is said in the majority opinion that "To hold that the parties 
have not entered into a valid contract for liquidated damages, 
it would be necessary to construe the agreement as one for a 
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penalty wherein the amount agreed upon bore no reasonable 
relation to the losses the parties eonsidered might be sustained. 
'rhis ean not be said to be true in this ease." Upon what pos-
sible, rational basis can it be said that the sum of $25 bears 
any reasonable relation to any loss which the parties con-
sidered might be sustained? Considering the price of lumber 
in 1939 (the time the contract was entered into), it might 
almost be said as a matter of judicial notice that $25 would 
not be reasonable compensation for a bale of shingles! But the 
majority, to sustain its unsound position, must strain at 
gnats to find a reason why the sum of $25 might bear some 
relation to any possible loss! Note: "The defendant points 
out that the detection system was intended to provide pro-
tection in case of a wide variety of fires. Some of them would 
be slow burning, as in a bed of sawdust, where a loss resulting 
from the failure of the detection system might be negligible. 
Other fires might result only in a pitted floor. Still others 
would immediately envelop the buildings in flames and result 
in a very substantial loss. Looking ahead the parties had no 
way of knowing what type of fire might occur after a par-
ticular failure of the detection system." It is then said that 
weather conditions, the particular season of the year, and the 
traffic, and the number of plaintiffs' employees present would 
all have a bearing on the loss sustained. 'rhe evidence showed 
that the fire fighting equipment arrived at the premises with-
in two minutes after the alarm had been given manually. 
Surely it would not have been difficult to determine in ad-
vance, from other fires in the vicinity, the type of service to 
be expected from the fire department, and as I have here-
tofore pointed out, the damage which might be expected from 
a fire in a particular part of plaintiffs' business. 
The characteristic feature of a penalty is that it bears no 
relation to the actual damage which may be caused by a 
breach, but is arbitrarily fixed without any attempt to esti-
mate the amount of injury (8 Cal.Jur. 847). "The tendency 
and preference of the law is to regard a stated sum as a 
penalty, except where the actual damages cannot be ascer-
tained by amy standard." (People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 
76 Cal. 29, 36 [18 P. 90] .) (Emphasis added.) Any provision 
by which money or property is to be forfeited without regard 
to ad nil I damage suffered, calls for a penalty and is there-
fore void (Fox Chicago R. Corp. v. Zukor's Dresses, Inc., 
50 Cal.App.2d 129 [122 P.2d 705]; Ebbert v. Mercantile 
Trust Co., 213 Cal. 496 [2 P.2d 776] ; Mente & Co. v. Fresno 
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C. & W. Co., 113 Cal.App. 325 [298 P. 126] ; White v. City 
of San Diego, 126 Cal.App. 501 [14 P.2d 1062]). A provision 
for liquidated damages in a contract for the purchase of stock 
was held to be void since it was neither impracticable nor 
extremely difficult to fix the seller's actual damage for the 
purchaser's breach (Porter v. Gibson, 25 Cal.2d 506 [154 
P.2d 703] ). 
In McCormick on Damages, page 606, et sequitur, it is said 
that courts are tending to adopt as the sole test whether the 
ammmt named was reasonably proportionate to the prob-
able loss. It is said that "the law's sole purpose in departing 
from its usual rule of enforcing agreements, when it de-
clines to enforce agreements for penalties, is to avoid the 
extortion and injustice which a free power to stipttlate dam-
ages would invite, the proper test of whether a particular 
stipulation is a penalty (that is, is unenforceable) is whether, 
viewed as of the time of its making, it is reasonably pro-
portioned to the probable loss which will ensue from a breach.'' 
(Emphasis added.) In Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trttst, 280 U.S. 
224, 226 [50 S.Ct. 142, 74 L.Ed. 382], a tenant had stipulated 
that, in the event of his bankruptcy, the lessor should be en-
titled to damages equal to the rent for the balance of the 
term. The term was two years and the rent was $4,000 a 
year. The tenant became bankrupt fifteen months before the 
lease expired, the lessor demanded damages of $5,000 under 
the agreement. The Supreme Court said: ''The amount thus 
stipulated is so disproportionate to any damage reasonably to 
be anticipated in the circumstances disclosed that we must 
hold the provision is for an unenforceable penalty." (Em-
phasis added.) 
It is my opinion that the majority opinion is wrong for two 
reasons : The damages to be expected could have been ascer-
tained at the time of entering into the contract and cannot 
be said, as a matter of law, to be "impracticable or extremely 
difficult" to fix; and that it cannot be said that the sum of $25 
bears any reasonable proportion to the loss which might be 
expected from the failure of the fire detection system to 
operate. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March 
5, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
